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Abstract—Biometric authentication systems are widely applied because
they offer inherent advantages over classical knowledge-based and token-
based personal-identification approaches. This has led to the development
of products using palmprints as biometric traits and their use in several
real applications. However, as biometric systems are vulnerable to replay,
database, and brute-force attacks, such potential attacks must be analyzed
before biometric systems are massively deployed in security systems. This
correspondence proposes a projected multinomial distribution for study-
ing the probability of successfully using brute-force attacks to break into
a palmprint system. To validate the proposed model, we have conducted a
simulation. Its results demonstrate that the proposed model can accurately
estimate the probability. The proposed model indicates that it is compu-
tationally infeasible to break into the palmprint system using brute-force
attacks.
Index Terms—Brute-force attack, palmprint, passwords, secure
authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Current security systems that automatically identify individuals
commonly use either tokens of private knowledge such as a password
or a private possession such as a smart card. Such tokens are insecure
in that they can be lost, shared, stolen, or duplicated. In this respect,
biometric authentication approaches that use physiological and be-
havioral characteristics such as the iris, retina, fingerprint, palmprint,
signature, or gait [2] are much more secure. They are not, however,
invulnerable. For example, they are open to database, replay, and brute-
force attacks.
Fig. 1 shows a number of points, Points 1–8, all being vulnerable
points as identified by the studies in [4] and [5]. The potential attack
points are between and on the common components of a biometric
system, input sensor, feature extractor, matcher, and database, and
are especially open to attack when the biometric systems are em-
ployed on remote and unattended applications, giving the attackers
enough time to make complex and numerous attempts to break in.
At Point 1, a system can be spoofed using fake biometrics such as
artificial gummy fingerprints and face masks [6]. At Point 2, it is
possible to avoid liveness tests in the sensors by using a prerecorded
biometric signal such as a fingerprint image. This is a so-called replay
attack. At Point 3, the original output features can be replaced with
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a predefined feature by using a Trojan horse to override the feature-
extraction process. At Point 4, it is possible to use both the brute-force
and replay attacks, submitting on the one hand numerous synthetic
templates or, on the other, prerecorded templates. At Point 5, original
matching scores can be replaced with preselected matching scores by
using a Trojan horse. At Point 6, it is possible to insert templates
from unauthorized users into the database or to modify templates in
the database. At Point 7, replay attacks are once again possible. At
Point 8, it is possible to override the system’s decision output and to
collect the matching scores to generate the images in the registered
database [15].
Recently, many biometric and security researchers have proposed
techniques for preventing and detecting these attacks [3]–[5], [7]–[9],
[12], [17], [22], [23]. Some researchers have employed watermarking
and encryption to prevent replay attacks at Points 2, 4, and 7 [9],
[17], [22] and have developed antispoofing techniques for specific
biometrics to prevent attacks at Point 1 [3], [12]. Other researchers
have produced analyses of specific attack types vis-à-vis specific
biometrics, for example, the brute-force attacks at Point 4 of the
fingerprint systems [4], [5], [7]. Unfortunately, the analysis of the
brute-force break-ins against the fingerprint systems is not applicable
to the palmprint systems since the template formats of the fingerprints
and the palmprints are different.
Given the commercial potential of the palmprint systems as security
applications, the wide variety of capture devices that now exist,
and the diversity of preprocessing, feature-extraction, matching, and
classification algorithms [1], [10], [11], [16], [18]–[20] that have been
produced in the field over the last seven years, it is certainly the case
that any security issues should be systematically addressed prior to
their widespread deployment. In this correspondence, we respond to
this need by being the first, to our knowledge, to successfully consider
security issues in the palmprint systems. Initially, we concentrate on
the brute-force attacks at Point 4. We will discuss other potential
attacks in forthcoming papers.
To prevent the brute-force attacks, the security systems based on
passwords allow a limited number of traits within a period of time. The
systems block the access for a certain amount of period if the limit is
over. However, this scheme is not suitable for identification systems
(one-to-many matching systems), as the palmprint system described
in this correspondence, since this scheme would block the accesses of
all users.
The rest of this correspondence is organized as follows. Section II
provides a brief summary of our palmprint system. Section III devel-
ops a probabilistic model describing the relationship between false-
acceptance rates and the number of attacks. Section IV validates the
proposed model and gives the experimental results. Section V offers
some concluding remarks.
II. SUMMARY OF THE PALMPRINT SYSTEM
EXPLOITING COMPETITIVE CODE
In this section, we briefly introduce our system, which employs a
palmprint-identification algorithm known as Competitive Code [19].
We choose to analyze Competitive Code in the context of brute-force
attacks rather than other palmprint-verification algorithms [13], [14],
[21] because it is the most accurate and the computationally fastest
algorithm developed by Zhang and his coworkers. The version of
Competitive Code used in this correspondence has been modified so
that it can reissue new templates when original templates have been
compromised. In other words, the new Competitive Code provides a
cancelable palmprint representation [4], [5], [7].
1083-4419/$20.00 © 2006 IEEE
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Fig. 1. Potential attack points in a biometric system.
Fig. 2. Palmprint-identification system using Competitive Code. (a) Palmprint scanner developed by the Biometrics Research Centre, The Hong Kong
Polytechnic University, (b) key points and coordinate system for palmprint segmentation and alignment, (c) preprocessed palmprint image for feature extraction,
and (d) Competitive Code, where different colors represent different orientations.
Like other biometric systems, a typical palmprint verification
or identification system consists of four components: an image-
acquisition component, a preprocessing component, a feature-
extraction component, and a matching component [10], [11], [16]. The
specifics of the four components of our system are as follows.
1) Image acquirer: This component transmits a palmprint image
from the palmprint scanner to a computer. Fig. 2(a) shows a
palmprint scanner developed by the Biometrics Research Centre
of The Hong Kong Polytechnic University. Its design principles
can be found in [10].
2) Preprocessor: This component detects the two key points be-
tween fingers to establish a coordinate system for aligning the
different palmprint images. The coordinate system is then used
to extract the central parts of the palmprint images. Fig. 2(b)
shows the key points and the coordinate system, and Fig. 2(c)
shows a preprocessed palmprint image.
3) Feature extractor: Our original algorithm applies six real Gabor
filters with fixed orientations to a preprocessed palmprint image,
I(x, y) [19] to estimate the local orientation field as features.
The filters are defined as
ψ(x, y, x0, y0, ω, θ, κ) =
ω√
2πκ
e
− ω2
8κ2
(4x′2+y′2)
×
(
cos(ωx′)− e−κ
2
2
)
(1)
where x′ = (x− x0) cos θ + (y − y0) sin θ, y′ = −(x−
x0) sin θ + (y − y0) cos θ, (x0, y0) is the center of the
function, ω is the radial frequency in radians per unit length, and
θ is the orientation of the Gabor filters in radians. κ is defined as
κ =
√
2 ln 2((2δ + 1)/(2δ − 1)), where δ is the half-amplitude
bandwidth of the frequency response. The original orientations
of the six filters, θv are vπ/6, where v = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
The orientation of a local region is estimated using a competitive
rule, k = arg(minv(I(x, y)∗ψ(x, y, x0, y0, ω, θv, κ)) where ∗
represents convolution and k is called the winning index. To
achieve a cancelable representation, we embed a random field
α(x0, y0) following a uniform distribution with support 0, π/6,
2π/6, 3π/6, 4π/6, and 5π/6. The value of α(x0, y0) depends
on the filter center (x0, y0). As the result, the competitive
rule becomes k = arg(minv(I(x, y)∗ψ(x, y, x0, y0, ω, θv +
α(x0, y0), κ)). When we reissue a new template, we need only
to replace the original random field with a new random field.
Fig. 2(d) shows a final feature code. The random field destroys
all the line features and therefore looks like a noisy image. We
still refer to the final feature code as Competitive Code.
4) Angular comparer: This component compares two Compet-
itive Codes by using an angular distance. Table I gives all
the possible angular distances between two winning indexes.
Summing up all the angular distances at different positions,
we have the angular distance between two Competitive Codes
defined as
Af (P,Q) =
32∑
x=1
32∑
y=1
A(Px,y, Qx,y) (2)
where Px,y(Qx,y) is a winning index of Competitive Code,
P (Q) at position (x, y) and A(Px,y, Qx,y) is the angular dis-
tance between the two winning indexes. To support a real-
time identification in large databases, we provide a coding
scheme to encode the winning indexes so that we can implement
angular distance using Boolean operators. Table II gives the
coding scheme. The corresponding bitwise angular distance is
defined as
Af (P,Q) =
32∑
x=1
32∑
y=1
3∑
i=1
P bi (x, y)⊗Qbi (x, y) (3)
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TABLE I
ALL POSSIBLE ANGULAR DISTANCES BETWEEN DIFFERENT WINNING INDEXES
TABLE II
BITWISE REPRESENTATION OF COMPETITIVE CODE
where P bi (Qbi ) is the ith bit plane of P (Q) and ⊗ is the bitwise
exclusive OR. Occasionally, as a result of the incorrect placement
of hands, some palmprints contain nonpalmprint pixels. All the
nonpalmprint pixels are black since they belong to the capture
device. We can use a simple threshold to classify them. We use
a bit plane as a mask to denote the nonpalmprint pixels. Finally,
the bitwise angular distance is defined as
Af (P,Q)
=
32∑
y=1
32∑
x=1
3∑
i=1
(PM (x, y) ∩QM (x, y)) ∩
(
P bi (x, y)⊗Qbi (x, y)
)
3
32∑
y=1
32∑
x=1
PM (x, y) ∩QM (x, y)
(4)
where ∩ is the bitwise AND and PM (QM ) is the mask of P (Q).
Obviously, Af is between 0 and 1. For a perfect matching, the
angular distance is zero. To account for alignment imperfections,
we generate 25 translated Competitive Codes by translating
the preprocessed image. In other words, we have 25 angular
distances when we match two palmprints. The minimum of these
distances is regarded as the final angular distance, AF . Using a
3-GHz processor, the bitwise angular distance can make 100 000
comparisons/s.
III. PROBABILISTIC MODEL FOR ANALYZING
BRUTE-FORCE BREAK-INS
The study of the brute-force break-ins requires a probabilistic model
that describes the relationship between the number of attacks and
the probability of a false acceptance. Therefore, it is necessary to
establish a probabilistic model for the angular distance given in (4).
To simplify the model, we assume that all the preprocessed palmprint
images are clear and devoid of the nonpalmprint pixels. This will allow
us to neglect the masks and the normalization terms. We could get
exactly the same result for this analysis by using either the integer
representation or the bitwise representation of Competitive Code, but
for the purposes of the presentation, it is more convenient to use the
integer representation. Thus, we consider the angular distance given in
(2) for the following analysis.
TABLE III
DISTRIBUTION OF WINNING INDEXES
Let W = [w0, w1, w2, w3] be a random vector where wi is the
number of A(Px,y, Qx,y) = i in (2), and let pi be the probability
of A(Px,y, Qx,y) = i. As a result, the angular distance described in
(2) can be rewritten as Af (P,Q) = WKT , where K = [0, 1, 2, 3].
We assume that pi is stationary and A(Px,y, Qx,y) is independent.
By stationary, we mean that pi does not depend on the position
(x, y). Using these assumptions, we infer that W follows multinomial
distribution, i.e.,
f(w0, w1, w2, w3) =
n!
w0!w1!w2!w3!
pw00 p
w1
1 p
w2
2 p
w3
3 (5)
where n is equal to 1024, the size of the Competitive Codes. Thus, the
probability density function of the angular distance Af (P,Q) is
Pr (Af (P,Q) = t) =
∑
WWKT=t
f(wo, w1, w2, w3). (6)
Since f is a multinomial distribution and the summation can be
regarded as a projection on the lineWKT = t, we call this distribution
“projected multinomial distribution.”
Let Pr(Af (P,Q) < t) = F (t) and therefore Pr(Af (P,Q) ≥ t) =
1− F (t), where F (t) is the cumulative distribution of Af (P,Q). The
probability of the final angular distance AF being greater than the
threshold t is
Pr (AF (P,Q) ≥ t) = (1− F (t))m (7)
where m, the number of translated matchings, is 25. If we make
z independent comparisons, the probability of all the final angular
distances being greater than or equal to t is
Pr (AF (Pi, Qi) ≥ t|∀i = 1, . . . , z) = (1− F (t))mz (8)
where Pi and Qi represent the different Competitive Codes. Conse-
quently, the probability of at least one of the final angular distances
being shorter than t is
Pr (mini (AF (Pi, Qi)) < t) = 1− (1− F (t))mz . (9)
We can now analyze the brute-force attacks against our palmprint
system using (9). For verification, each attackers’ template, Pi is
compared only with the templates associated with a particular user.
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Fig. 3. (a)–(d) Estimated p0p3 at different positions, respectively, where black represents probability zero while white represents probability one.
Fig. 4. Model validation and predications. (a) Empirical and theoretical distributions from nontranslated matchings, (b) plot of predicted cumulative probability
against the observed cumulative probability for nontranslated matchings, (c) plot of the predicted cumulative probability against the observed cumulative
probability for translated matching, and (d) probability of the false acceptances against different thresholds.
We assume that each user only has one template Q in the database, and
to attack the system the hackers submit z templates. The probability of
a false acceptance for verification is
Pr (miniAF (Pi, Q) < t) = 1− (1− F (t))mz (10)
the same as in (9).
For identification, each submitted templatePi as a brute-force attack
is compared with all the templates in the database. Let the templates in
the database be Qj where j = 1, . . . , b. As in the previous discussion,
we let the number of the templates for the brute-force attack be z.
Therefore, the probability of the false acceptance occurring in an
identification system with b templates in the database is
Pr (mini,jAF (Pi, Qj) < t) = 1− (1− F (t))mzb . (11)
Equation (10) for verification and (11) for identification each share the
same form. Thus, for simplicity of the presentation, we shall consider
only verification in the following experiments.
IV. MODEL VALIDATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The use of the probabilistic model to analyze the brute-force
attacks requires us to make some assumptions when obtaining the
model parameters pi. We assume that the winning indexes of Com-
petitive Code Q follow independent uniform distributions. In other
words, Pr(Qx,y = v) = 1/6, for all v = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. This
assumption holds since the random field is formed by the inde-
pendent uniform distributions. We do not make any assumptions
as to the winning indexes of the artificial Competitive Codes Pi.
Let cv be the probability of the winning index of Pi being equal
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to v. Using Table I, we can infer that p0 =
∑5
v=0
cv/6 = 1/6,
p1 = 2
∑5
v=0
cv/6 = 1/3, p2 = 2
∑5
v=0
cv/6 = 1/3, and p3 =∑5
v=0
cv/6 = 1/6.
Now that we have all the model parameters, we run a simulation
to validate the proposed model. For this simulation, we collect 11 074
palmprint images from 568 different palms. The images are 384 ×
284, and they have a resolution of 75 dpi. First of all, we use 100
different random fields to compute the Competitive Codes. Then, we
use uniform distribution to generate 100 artificial Competitive Codes
to attack each Competitive Code. Each artificial Competitive Code
is matched with the true Competitive Code as a brute-force attack.
Using the true Competitive Codes, we estimate the distribution of the
winning indexes in Table III, demonstrating that the winning index
follows a uniform distribution. We also estimate p0, p1, p2, and p3
at different positions in Fig. 3, where black represents a probability
zero while white represents a probability one. Fig. 3 demonstrates that
the stationary assumption for pi is held. The empirical distribution
and the proposed theoretical distribution of nontranslated matchings
are given in Fig. 4(a). We also plot the predicted cumulative prob-
ability against the observed cumulative probability from the non-
translated matchings and translated matchings in Fig. 4(b) and (c),
respectively. Fig. 4(a)–(c) demonstrates the predictive power of the
proposed model.
Now, we can use the proposed model to estimate the probability
of the successful break-ins. Fig. 4(d) plots the probability of the false
acceptance against different thresholds. We show only the threshold
between 0.36 and 0.39 since our system generally operates in this
range. Assume that our system can make one million comparisons,
ten times faster than our current implementations. The correspond-
ing computation times for z = 1011, 1012, 1013, 1014, and 1015 are
1.16 days, 11.5 days, 115 days, 3.17 years, and 31.7 years, respec-
tively. The computation times and the probabilities of the false accep-
tances demonstrate that it is impossible to use brute force to break into
our system.
V. CONCLUSION
This correspondence presents a systematic analysis of the brute-
force break-ins directed against our palmprint system. Using Com-
petitive Code as the features and angular distance as the matching
scheme, we set up a projected multinomial distribution to describe
the relationship between the probability of the false acceptance and
the number of attacks. According to our analysis, when the system
threshold is set to lower than 0.39, it is computationally infeasible to
break into our palmprint system using brute-force attacks.
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